If your first School applied for Working permit, you might expect troubles with WP at another School.

How long is since they applied for WP?

I would dial SAFEA (Gov., who issues WP and Foreign Expert Certificate) and ask them about it.

Enter 'SAFEA' in the search above and see the thread 'SAFEA address and contact no. around China'. Dial them up and ask Q. Prepare some excuse, why do you want to change the School ....

I see, you'll most likely have problems at another School, because you signed Contract with first School and you won't honor it.

That's one problem you have and another one is 'if Gov. started School's application for your WP', I would say you certainly won't get WP with another, new School.

http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/can-chinas-approach-internet-contr...

Can China’s Approach to Internet Control Spread around the World?

A ChinaFile Conversation

• May 9, 2017

Earlier this month, citing concerns over “cyber sovereignty,” China’s Internet regulators announced new restrictions on the country’s already tightly controlled Internet—further curbing online news reporting and putting Party appointed editors in charge. Plans were also announced for the compiling of a massive, officially sanctioned, online encyclopedia to rival Wikipedia, which Chinese censors routinely block. What does this mean for Internet freedom in other countries whose leaders also crave control over information? How much does China influence the shape of the Internet around the world? Where are the cracks in this seeming plan to press an agenda of total control? —The Editors

Thursday, May 4, 2017 - 4:03pm

China’s approach to the Internet has already spread beyond its borders. Turkey blocked all of Wikipedia just days ago. But the impact of the Digitized Chinese Encyclopedia is not so clear. If it is actually going to be a wiki—in the sense of a website where users can build, edit, and add to entries freely—then contributing scholars may have some leeway in their work. Just because the writers all come from national institutions doesn’t mean they all think the same way. Witness Cai Xia, a professor at the Central Party School who has criticized state violations of the law and called for internal Party reform; Yu Jianrong, rural sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and unabashed liberal; and many other outspoken people “in the system.” If those scholars are part of the Digital Chinese Encyclopedia team, they may have some sway.

If they don’t have any sway at all, the Chinese Encyclopedia will still have to compete with other well-established platforms. Many entries in Baidu Baike, for example, are editable, though there are predictable exceptions, like the entries on Xi Jinping and the Dalai Lama. But not the entry on Wikipedia, which informs readers that, while Wikipedia Chinese was blocked in 2015, versions in other languages are still available in China. It goes on, “Wikipedia can be accessed by modifying the hosts file and scaling the [Great Fire]wall. Because of this, Wikipedia content is often copy-pasted onto other websites.” So why turn to the official encyclopedia when you can find nuggets like these elsewhere?

Wikipedia Chinese is currently 90 percent blocked by the Great Firewall, according to GreatFire.org, while Wikipedia Cantonese is 100 percent blocked. But the English site isn’t blocked at all. Nor is the classical Chinese site, including its entries on June Fourth, the Democracy Wall, and the Jasmine Revolution.

So in order for the Chinese Encyclopedia to dominate, not only will it have to strictly police its contributors, it will also require regulation or total shut-down of similar websites and total blocking of Wikipedia. Even with all that, netizens will find cracks in the wall. As for this type of control spreading to other countries, it depends on what other places can afford, financially more than politically. Keeping the national intranet scrubbed isn’t cheap.

Monday, May 8, 2017 - 10:06pm

First things first. I think it’s inaccurate to compare the proposed encyclopedia with Wikipedia. The whole point of Wikipedia is that it is a bottom-up project, which attempts to build a collective undertaking on the basis of the wisdom of crowds. It is self-generated and self-policing. The Chinese project is nothing other than an online version of the enormous, multi-volume encyclopedias that used to fill the studies of schoolteachers and the upwardly mobile worldwide. It is, perhaps, better to call it the Encyclopaedia Sinica.

To be sure, this encyclopedia is one of the flagship parts of the broader project, as official parlance has it, to ensure the dominance of the Party’s voice in online discourse. Moreover, this project also encompasses China’s claim to sovereignty in cyberspace: the Chinese Internet authorities assert that as governments are entitled to effective control over their territory and population without interference from other states—as well as non-state actors—in the real world, they are entitled to the same in the online environment. This assertion has drawn opprobrium from various Western observers.

The problem, however, is that these observers usually derive their critique from a conception of information and communication technologies that has proven to be, at best, sadly naive. Where it was held that free and open communication of information would result in the spread of diplomacy, acceleration of economic and social development, and the buildup of a global community, it has now become clear that technology can equally be used to incite armed conflict, subvert democratic processes (including in the U.S. and the U.K.), and cause severe economic disruption.

One particular issue in politics is the erosion of authority due to the enormous potential of connectivity the Internet provides. Loonies and conspiracy theorists find in Internet technology a means to overcome the inability to compete with authoritative sources of information in the real world—or to put it short, fake news. Now, China has considerable experience in regulating public speech, even before the advent of the Internet, in a way that leaves little doubt as to the source of discursive authority. But, I do not foresee that Western countries will take over the Chinese method of having a highly centralized bureaucracy to continuously monitor what is fit to print (or retweet) and not. Mechanisms to reassert some form of authority will be developed, but they will take into account the sensitivities of the particular countries involved. For instance, Facebook may develop user-driven fake news detection and reporting systems.

However, what will be taken from China’s approach is an increasingly powerful role for states in cyberspace. Populations around the world are primarily looking to state actors to protect them from harms online. As a result, many states, including the United States, are now behaving as if they have the right to exercise sovereign power in cyberspace, even as they continue to berate China for claiming its own. For China, it is a strange vindication: in many ways, it got the Internet “right” far earlier than Western countries, who are merely now (in the Chinese perspective) swinging round to China’s commonsensical point of view.

In conclusion, it must also be noted that the China-U.S. (or Western) dimension is important, but not the only one in this respect. Increasingly, China’s approach to control starts to look highly prudent to many governments in the global South. Therefore, questions of China’s influence must not be merely seen in the light of whether “we” would take over a Chinese example, but also how the comparative prestige of China’s approach is perceived in third countries. Unfortunately for Western observers, the answer might be disappointing.